GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals

Mark L. Psiaki, Brady W. O'Hanlon, Jahshan A. Bhatti, Daniel P. Shepard, Todd E. Humphreys

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Abstract

Cross-correlation of unknown encrypted signals between two Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers is used for spoofing detection of publicly-known signals. This detection technique is one of the strongest known defenses against sophisticated spoofing attacks if the defended receiver has only one antenna. The attack strategy of concern overlays false GNSS radio-navigation signals on top of the true signals. The false signals increase in power, lift the receiver tracking loops off of the true signals, and drag the loops and the navigation solution to erroneous but consistent results. Hypothesis testing theory is used to develop a codeless cross-correlation detection method for use in inexpensive, narrowband civilian GNSS receivers. The detection method is instantiated by using the encrypted military Global Positioning System (GPS) P(Y) code on the L1 frequency in order to defend the publicly-known civilian GPS C/A code. Successful detection of spoofing attacks is demonstrated by off-line processing of recorded RF data from narrowband 2.5 MHz RF front-ends, which attenuate the wideband P(Y) code by 5.5 dB. The new technique can detect attacks using correlation intervals of 1.2 s or less.

LanguageEnglish (US)
Article number6621814
Pages2250-2267
Number of pages18
JournalIEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
Volume49
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 21 2013

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Global positioning system
Navigation
Satellites
Radio navigation
Drag
Antennas
Testing
Processing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Psiaki, M. L., O'Hanlon, B. W., Bhatti, J. A., Shepard, D. P., & Humphreys, T. E. (2013). GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals. IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 49(4), 2250-2267. [6621814]. DOI: 10.1109/TAES.2013.6621814

GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals. / Psiaki, Mark L.; O'Hanlon, Brady W.; Bhatti, Jahshan A.; Shepard, Daniel P.; Humphreys, Todd E.

In: IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, Vol. 49, No. 4, 6621814, 21.10.2013, p. 2250-2267.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Psiaki, ML, O'Hanlon, BW, Bhatti, JA, Shepard, DP & Humphreys, TE 2013, 'GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals' IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, vol. 49, no. 4, 6621814, pp. 2250-2267. DOI: 10.1109/TAES.2013.6621814
Psiaki ML, O'Hanlon BW, Bhatti JA, Shepard DP, Humphreys TE. GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals. IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems. 2013 Oct 21;49(4):2250-2267. 6621814. Available from, DOI: 10.1109/TAES.2013.6621814
Psiaki, Mark L. ; O'Hanlon, Brady W. ; Bhatti, Jahshan A. ; Shepard, Daniel P. ; Humphreys, Todd E./ GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals. In: IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems. 2013 ; Vol. 49, No. 4. pp. 2250-2267
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