GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals

Mark L. Psiaki, Brady W. O'Hanlon, Jahshan A. Bhatti, Daniel P. Shepard, Todd E. Humphreys

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    • 41 Citations

    Abstract

    Cross-correlation of unknown encrypted signals between two Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers is used for spoofing detection of publicly-known signals. This detection technique is one of the strongest known defenses against sophisticated spoofing attacks if the defended receiver has only one antenna. The attack strategy of concern overlays false GNSS radio-navigation signals on top of the true signals. The false signals increase in power, lift the receiver tracking loops off of the true signals, and drag the loops and the navigation solution to erroneous but consistent results. Hypothesis testing theory is used to develop a codeless cross-correlation detection method for use in inexpensive, narrowband civilian GNSS receivers. The detection method is instantiated by using the encrypted military Global Positioning System (GPS) P(Y) code on the L1 frequency in order to defend the publicly-known civilian GPS C/A code. Successful detection of spoofing attacks is demonstrated by off-line processing of recorded RF data from narrowband 2.5 MHz RF front-ends, which attenuate the wideband P(Y) code by 5.5 dB. The new technique can detect attacks using correlation intervals of 1.2 s or less.

    LanguageEnglish (US)
    Article number6621814
    Pages2250-2267
    Number of pages18
    JournalIEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
    Volume49
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 21 2013

    Fingerprint

    Global positioning system
    Navigation
    Satellites
    Radio navigation
    Drag
    Antennas
    Testing
    Processing

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Aerospace Engineering
    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

    Cite this

    Psiaki, M. L., O'Hanlon, B. W., Bhatti, J. A., Shepard, D. P., & Humphreys, T. E. (2013). GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals. IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 49(4), 2250-2267. [6621814]. DOI: 10.1109/TAES.2013.6621814

    GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals. / Psiaki, Mark L.; O'Hanlon, Brady W.; Bhatti, Jahshan A.; Shepard, Daniel P.; Humphreys, Todd E.

    In: IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, Vol. 49, No. 4, 6621814, 21.10.2013, p. 2250-2267.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Psiaki, ML, O'Hanlon, BW, Bhatti, JA, Shepard, DP & Humphreys, TE 2013, 'GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals' IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, vol 49, no. 4, 6621814, pp. 2250-2267. DOI: 10.1109/TAES.2013.6621814
    Psiaki ML, O'Hanlon BW, Bhatti JA, Shepard DP, Humphreys TE. GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals. IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems. 2013 Oct 21;49(4):2250-2267. 6621814. Available from, DOI: 10.1109/TAES.2013.6621814
    Psiaki, Mark L. ; O'Hanlon, Brady W. ; Bhatti, Jahshan A. ; Shepard, Daniel P. ; Humphreys, Todd E./ GPS spoofing detection via dual-receiver correlation of military signals. In: IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems. 2013 ; Vol. 49, No. 4. pp. 2250-2267
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